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Abstract 
Since the start of the financial crisis in 2007, the debate on the proper level leverage of 
financial institutions has been flourishing. The paper addresses such crucial issue 
within the Eurace artificial economy, by considering the effects that different choices of 
capital adequacy ratios for banks have on main economic indicators. The study also 
gives us the opportunity to examine the outcomes of the Eurace model so to discuss the 
nature of endogenous money, giving a contribution to a debate that has grown stronger 
over the last two decades. A set of 40 years long simulations have been performed and 
examined in the short (first 5 years), medium (the following 15 years) and long (the last 
20 years) run. Results point out a non-trivial dependence of real economic variables 
such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the unemployment rate and the aggregate 
capital stock on banks’ capital adequacy ratios; this dependence is in place due to the 
credit channel and varies significantly according to the chosen evaluation horizon. In 
general, while boosting the economy in the short run, regulations allowing for a high 
leverage of the banking system tend to be depressing in the medium and long run. 
Results also point out that the stock of money is driven by the demand for loans, 
therefore supporting the theory of endogenous nature of credit money. 
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Abstract
Since the start of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007, the debate on the proper level
leverage of ﬁnancial institutions has been ﬂourishing. The paper addresses such
crucial issue within the Eurace artiﬁcial economy, by considering the effects that
different choices of capital adequacy ratios for banks have on main economic in-
dicators. The study also gives us the opportunity to examine the outcomes of the
Eurace model so to discuss the nature of endogenous money, giving a contribution
to a debate that has grown stronger over the last two decades. A set of 40 years
long simulations have been performed and examined in the short (ﬁrst 5 years),
medium (the following 15 years) and long (the last 20 years) run. Results point out
a non-trivial dependence of real economic variables such as the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), the unemployment rate and the aggregate capital stock on banks’
capital adequacy ratios; this dependence is in place due to the credit channel and
varies signiﬁcantly according to the chosen evaluation horizon. In general, while
boosting the economy in the short run, regulations allowing for a high leverage of
the banking system tend to be depressing in the medium and long run. Results
also point out that the stock of money is driven by the demand for loans, therefore
supporting the theory of endogenous nature of credit money.
Introduction
The agent-based modelling approach applied to economics allows to take into account
the complex pattern of interactions among different economic agents in a realistic
and complete way. The Eurace simulator is an agent-based model of the macroecon-
omy characterized by different kinds of agents, namely, households, ﬁrms, commer-
cial banks, a Government and a Central Bank, and by different decentralized markets,
characterized by pairwise exchange interactions, such as a labor market, a goods mar-
ket, and a credit market; a ﬁnancial market is also present, where ﬁrm equity shares
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1and government bonds are exchanged in a centralized way through a clearing house
[14, 24].
This paper investigates the impact of bank lending regulation on macroeconomic
activity by considering a set of economic variables as indicators. The regulatory pa-
rameter considered is the leverage ratio of commercial banks, i.e. the ratio between the
value of the loan portfolio held by banks, weighted with a measure of the loan riski-
ness, and banks net worth or equity, along the lines of capital adequacy ratios set by
the Basel II agreement [1].
The debate on implications and consequences of capital adequacy requirements for
banks has been growing in the last three decades [10, 11] and has drawn particular
attention after the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009 [19, 7]. The discussion focuses on
the beneﬁcial effects of equity requirements compared to the disadvantages in terms of
economic costs and credit market effectiveness. Some of the main controversial aspects
about the implications of higher equity requirements are clearly resumed in [6]. The
main beneﬁt of increased equity capital requirements is claimed to be the weakening
of systemic risk, while potential drawbacks are, among others, the reduction of return
on equity (ROE) for banks, the restriction of lending, and the increase of funding costs
for banks. This paper focuses on the macroeconomic implications of capital adequacy
regulation, studying its effect on banks’ lending activity and therefore on the main
economic indicators such as GDP, unemployment and inﬂation. In particular, three
different time horizons are considered (short, medium and long run) in order to analyze
the macroeconomic outcomes of the Eurace artiﬁcial economy so to take into account
also the long-term effects.
The long-term macroeconomic impact of capital requirements has been intensively
examined after the last ﬁnancial crisis, see [5, 3, 4] and [8] for some complete and rep-
resentative studies by central banks or by international institutions performing policy
analysis and ﬁnancial advising, like the BIS1 or the IIF2. An analysis of these reports,
along with a critical assessment of the used models, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Let us simply summarize the main common results. Firstly, higher capital requirements
reduce the probability of banking crises. Secondly, it emerges that an increase in the
capital ratio causes a decline in the level of output; the magnitude of the effect depends
on the speciﬁc model. Thirdly, a higher capital ratio tends to dampen output volatility,
especially if counter-cyclical capital buffers schemes are adopted. These main results
have been obtained using a variety of models (see [3] for a list), mainly Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models or semi-structural models. DSGE can
be considered as the standard type of model currently used in macroeconomics, even
though they have been widely criticized both for their difﬁculties in explaining some
economicphenomena(seeforinstance[12,20])andforthefactthattheassumedequiv-
alence between the micro and the macro behavior in DSGE models does not allow to
take properly into account interaction and coordination among economic agents [13].
The aim of this study is to present an alternative approach based on a fully en-
dogenous agent-based model whose dynamics does not depend on external stochastic
processes but mainly on the interaction of economic agents populating the artiﬁcial
1The Bank for International Settlements; http://www.bis.org
2The Institute of International Finance, Inc.; http://www.iif.com/
2economy. See [25] for a comprehensive survey on agent-based computational eco-
nomics and [2] for an overview of the Eurace model.
In concrete terms, a set of computational experiments have been carried out with
the objective to study the performance of the economic system according to different
values of the capital ratio requirement. The outcomes of this what-if analysis show how
the main macroeconomic variables characterizing the Eurace economy, i.e. both real
variables (such as GDP, unemployment and capital stock), and nominal variables (such
as wage and price levels) are affected by the aggregate amount of loans provided by
banks, which in turn depends on banks net worth or equity and on the allowed leverage
ratio.
Theinterpretationofresultscanbepossiblydoneinaccordancewiththelinesofthe
endogenous credit-money approach of the post-Keynesian tradition [17, 9, 21]. Con-
trary to the neoclassical synthesis, where money is an exogenous variable controlled by
the central bank through its provisionof required reserves, to which a deposit multiplier
is applied to determine the quantity of privately-supplied bank deposits, the essence
of endogenous money theory is that in modern economies money is an intrinsically
worthless token of value whose stock is determined by the demand of bank credit by
the production or commercial sectors and can therefore expand and contract regard-
less of government policy. Money is then essentially credit-money originated by loans
which are created from nothing as long as the borrower is credit-worthy and some in-
stitutional constraints, such as the Basel II capital adequacy ratios, are not violated. As
the demand for loans by the private sector increases, banks normally make more loans
and create more banking deposits, without worrying about the quantity of reserves on
hand, and the central bank usually accommodates the demand of reserves at the short
term interest rate, which is the only variable that the monetary authorities can control.
The modeling architecture of the Eurace economy, which has been conceived in
order to closely mimic the functioning of a modern credit-driven economy, strongly
conﬁrms the endogenous theory view. Based on this conceptual framework, we inves-
tigate the relationship between endogenous credit money and macroeconomic activity,
by examining computational experiments where the institutional (e.g. Basel II) con-
straints on bank leverage are exogenously set.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 an overall description of the credit
market model is given, both considering the ﬁrms and the banks sides. Section 2
presents the computational results of our study and a related discussion. Conclusions
are drawn in section 3.
1 The credit market model
In the following, we outline the main features of the Eurace credit market model by
describing how the demand of credit by ﬁrms arises to ﬁnance their production and liq-
uidity needs, how the supply of credit by banks is conditioned by their capital adequacy
ratio and how borrowers (ﬁrms) and lenders (banks) match their respective demand and
supply schedules in the market.
31.1 Firms’ side
Two types of ﬁrms are considered in the Eurace model: capital goods producers and
consumptiongoodsproducers. Capitalgoodsproducersemploylabortoproduceonjob
capital goods that will be used as production factor together with labor by consumption
goods producers. Given job production and only labor as production factors, capital
goods producers, contrary to consumption goods producers, have not inventories as
well as ﬁnancing needs. In the following we will describe in more detail consumption
goods producers, henceforth generally identiﬁed as ﬁrms.
Once a month, every ﬁrm computes its total liquidity needs, given by the liquid-
ity necessary to meet its ﬁnancial payments and by the expected cost of the planned
production schedule. In particular, ﬁrm f at month t is subject to the following ﬁnan-
cial payments: the interest payments on its debt, henceforth R
f
t , the debt installment,
henceforth I
f
t , taxes T
f
t and dividends payments D
f
t . The total liquidity needs L
f
t of ﬁrm












t , where C
f
t are the the expected
costs of the planned production schedule.
Firms plan the monthly production schedule by considering the stock of inventories
kept by the different malls selling their products, and by estimating the demand using
a linear regression based on previous demands. Production is carried out according to
a Cobb-Douglas type function, with two factors of production, i.e. labor and capital; a
desired capital to labor ratio is calculated considering the marginal rate of substitution
of the two factors, which depends on the given money wage and the cost of capital.
Given the planned monthly production schedule and the desired capital to labor ratio,
the desired capital endowment and the labor demand are determined by inverting the
Cobb-Douglas production function. Demand for investments then depends on the dif-
ference between the desired and the actual capital endowment (see [15, 16] for details).
According to the pecking-order theory [22], any ﬁrm f meets its liquidity needs
ﬁrst by using its internal liquid resources P
f
t , i.e., the cash account deposited at a given








t to the banking system
so to be able to cover entirely its foreseen payments. Credit linkages between ﬁrm f
and bank b are deﬁned by a connectivity matrix which is randomly created whenever a
ﬁrm enters the credit market in search for funding. In order to take search costs as well
as incomplete information into account, each ﬁrm links with a maximum of n banks of
the same region, which are chosen in a random way.
Firms have to reveal to the linked banks information about their current equity and
debt levels, along with the amount of the loan requested l
f
t . Using this information,
according to the decision rules outline din the next section, each contacted bank b







t ), calculates the interest rate i
bf
t associated to the loan and communicates it to
the ﬁrm. After this ﬁrst consulting meeting where ﬁrm’s credit worthiness has been
assessed by the bank, each ﬁrm asks for credit starting with the bank with the lowest
interest rate. On banks’ hand, they receive demands by ﬁrms sequentially and deal
with them in a “ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served” basis. As explained with more detail in the
following section, the ﬁrm can be credit rationed. If a ﬁrm can not obtain a sufﬁcient
amount of credit from the bank that is offering the best interest rate, the ﬁrm will ask
4credit to the bank offering the second best interest rate, until the last connected bank of
the list is reached. It is worth noting that, although the individual ﬁrm asks loans to the
bank with the lowest lending rate, the total demand for loans does not depend directly
on the interest rates of loans.
When ﬁrm f receives a loan, its cash account P
f
t is then increased by the amount
of it. If the ﬁrm is not able to collect the needed credit amount, i.e., if P
f
t is still lower
than L
f
t , the ﬁrm has still has the possibility to issue new equity shares and sell them
on the stock market. If the new shares are not sold out, the ﬁrm enters a state called
ﬁnancial crisis. When a ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial crisis, we mainly distinguish two cases (see
[2] for further details): if the ﬁrm’s available internal liquidity is still sufﬁcient to meet
its committed ﬁnancial payments, i.e., taxes, the debt instalment and interests on debt,
then these ﬁnancial payments are executed and the dividend payout and the production
schedule are rearranged to take into account the reduced available liquidity; otherwise,
the ﬁrm is unable to pay it ﬁnancial commitments and it goes into bankruptcy.
1.2 Banks’ side
The primary purpose of banks is to channel funds received from deposits towards loans
to ﬁrms. When a ﬁrm f contacts a bank b to know its credit conditions, the ﬁrm has to
inform the bank about its equity level E
f
t and its total debt D
f
t , deﬁned as the sum of
the loans that the ﬁrm has received from every bank and that it has not yet payed back.
Any bank meets the demand for a loan, provided that the risk-reward proﬁle of the loan
is considered acceptable by the bank. The reward is given by the interest rate which is
charged and the risk is deﬁned by the likelihood that the loan will default. Given the
loan request amount l
f
t by ﬁrm f, bank b calculates the probability that the ﬁrm will












The default probability p
f
t correctly increases with the ﬁrm’s leverage and is used as
a risk weight in computing the risk-weighted loan portfolio of banks, henceforth Wb
t .
According to the computed credit worthiness of the ﬁrm, the bank informs it about the









t is the interest rate set by the central bank and gb
t p
f
t is the risk spread depend-
ing on the ﬁrm’s credit risk. The parameter gb
t sets the spread sensitivity to the credit
worthiness of the ﬁrm and is an evolving parameter that basically adjusts in order to
reinforce the previous choices that were successful in increasing the bank’s proﬁts. The
central bank acts as the “lender of last resort”, providing liquidity to the banking sector
at the interest rate ic
t. Finally, it is worth noting that banks lending rate does not depend
on the expected demand for loans but only on the evaluation of ﬁrm’s credit risk.
Banks can then lend money, provided that ﬁrms wish to take out new loans and that
their regulatory capital requirement are fulﬁlled. It is worth noting that granting new
5Assets Liabilities
Mb: liquidity Sb: standing facility
deposited at the central bank (debt to the central bank)
L b: bank’s loan portfolio Db: total (households’ and ﬁrms’) deposits
at the bank
Eb: equity
Table 1: Bank’s balance sheet
loans inﬂates the balance sheet of the banking system because it generates also new
deposits3.
The model regulatory capital requirement are inspired by Basel II accords and state
that the capital ratio of banks, given by the equity Eb
t divided by the risk-weighted
assets Wb
t , has to be higher than a given threshold, deﬁned as 1
a, where a is the key
policy parameter used in this study. Hence, if ﬁrm f asks for a loan l
f
t , bank b supplies
a credit amount ℓ
bf


































The value of risk-weighted assetsWb
t is computed by the weighted sum of outstanding
loans of bank b where the weights are given by the default probability (the default risk)
of each loan deﬁned in Eq. 1. Bank’s liquidity, i.e., Mb as in Table 1, is an asset but its
default risk shall be considered zero, therefore it does non enter in the computation of
Wb
t .
The parameter a can be interpreted as the leverage level banks are allowed to have.
Equations 3 state that bank b is available to satisfy entirely the loan demand l
f
t if it
does not push Wb
t above the Basel II threshold, set at a time the net worth (equity) of
the bank, otherwise the bank can satisfy the loan demand only partially or even is not
available to lend any money at all, and ﬁrm f is rationed in the credit market. Thus, it
can be argued that banks are quantity takers and price setters in the loans market, with
the policy constraint of a ﬁxed capital adequacy ratio.
Inordertobettervisualizethestock-ﬂowaccountsforbanks, atypicalbalancesheet
of a bank is reported in table 1. For any bank b, the stocks of total deposits Db and loans
L b are updated daily following the changes in their stock levels, i.e., changes in the
private sector (households and ﬁrms) deposits due to payments (i.e. ﬂows of money
among private sector agents) and changes in the loan portfolio due to the granting of
new loans and old loan repayments. The stock of liquidity Mb of bank b is then updated
accordingly following the standard accounting rule Mb = Sb +Db +Eb  L b. If Mb
becomes negative, Sb, i.e., the standing facility with the Central Bank, is increased to
set Mb = 0. If Mb is positive and the bank has a debt with central bank, i.e. Sb > 0,
3When a loan is taken and spent, it creates a deposits in the bank account of the agent to whom the
payment is made. In particular, ﬁrms pay wages to workers and pay new physical capital to investment
ﬁrms, that are owned by households and redistribute net earnings to them.
6Sb is partially or totally repaid for a maximum amount equal to Mb. Finally, at the end
of the trading day, both liquidity Mb and equity Eb are updated to take into account in
the same way of any money ﬂows which regards the bank b, i.e., interest revenues and
expenses, taxes and dividends. The bank can choose if to pay or not to pay dividends to
shareholders and this choice is crucial for driving the equity dynamics. In particular, if
abankissubjecttocreditsupplyrestrictionduetoalownetworthcomparedtotherisk-
weighted assets portfolio, then it stops paying dividends so to raise its equity capital
and increaser the chance to match in the future the unmet credit demand. Finally, loans
are extinguished in a predetermined and ﬁxed number of constant installments.
For a more detailed explanation of the stock-ﬂow accounts in the Eurace model and
of its “balance sheet approach”, see [23].
2 Results and discussion
Computationalexperimentshavebeenperformedconsideringasimulationsettingchar-
acterizedby2,000 households, 20consumption goodsproducers, 3banks, 1 investment
goods producer, 1 government, and 1 central bank. The experiments consist in running
several simulations of the Eurace model, varying the values of the capital adequacy
ratio and observing the macroeconomic implications of the different bank regulation
settings. Values of a have been set in the range from 4 to 9, where a = 4 corresponds
to the case of the tightest capital requirement and a = 9 to the most permissive case.
Figure 1 presents typical time series paths referred to the production and sales of
consumption goods (top panel) and investments in capital goods (bottom panel). Con-
sidering that the Eurace model foresees a job production of investment goods, demand
of capital goods always coincides with supply as evidenced by the single line in the
bottom of ﬁgure 1. On the contrary, the consumption goods case in the top panel
shows two lines, a black one, representing sales, and a gray one for production. The
existence of inventories, not represented in the ﬁgure, explain while sometime sales
may be higher than production. The Gross Domestic Production (GDP) of the Eurace
economy should be then considered as the sum of the consumption goods (top panel)
and capital goods (bottom panel) production.
It is worth noting that the time series showed in Figure 1 are characterized by realis-
tic graphical patterns. First, values referred to aggregate investments are much smaller
than values assumed by aggregate consumption and, nevertheless, much more volatile.
Second, the time series considered in Figure 1 clearly exhibit irregular cycles which
are mainly characterized by steep ascents and descents as well as periods of steady
and moderate growth, with a varying periodicity whose duration could be measured in
years. Third, long-run growth can be observed both in the production and sales time
series as well as in the investments path. The cycles in the investments time series are
clearly correlated with the ones in the two time series referred to production and sales,
and can be easily interpreted as business cycles. It is also worth noting that the sources
of these business cycles are endogenous, i.e., Eurace business cycles are the product
of agents’ behavior and interaction, as no stochastic exogenous shock is foreseen in
the model setting. We argue the important role played in this respect by ﬂuctuations
in investments and disruptions in the supply chain caused by ﬁrms bankruptcies and












































Figure 1: Top panel: aggregate production of consumption goods and sales (aggregate
households’ consumption). Bottom panel: investments in capital goods by the produc-
tion sector. Values reported in the y-axis are real values, i.e., nominal values at current
prices divided by the price index. The value of a is set to 5.
consequent inactivities. As outlined in Section 1.1, demand for investments depends,
among other things, on expected aggregate demand for consumption goods; therefore
an increase of unemployment reduces the aggregate demand as well as demand for
investments, which in turn, like in a positive feedback mechanism, increase unemploy-
ment by reducing the employment also at investment good producers. Furthermore, in
the bankruptcy4 case, a reduction of aggregate supply also occurs due to the inactivity
of the ﬁrm for a while.
Figure 2 presents the typical simulation paths of the key real economic variables,
i.e., the ﬁrms’ aggregate stock of physical capital (top panel), the unemployment rate
(central panel) and the real GDP (bottom panel). For any of the three economic vari-
ables considered, we represent the time path related to two different values of a, i.e.,
a = 5 and a = 9. The time series have been represented ceteris paribus, including the
same seed of the pseudo-random number generator. Consistent with the two compo-
4The bankruptcy for insolvency occurs when the net worth of the ﬁrm becomes lower than zero. In that
case, ﬁrm’ shareholders are wiped out and all workers are ﬁred; the debt is also restructured and loans are
partially written-off in the lending banks’ portfolios; the ﬁrm’s physical capital is frozen and the ﬁrm remains
inactive as long as new ﬁnancial capital is raised in the stock market.








































































Figure 2: Firms’ aggregate stock of physical capital (top panel), unemployment rate
(central panel) and real GDP (bottom panel). Two different values of a have been
considered for the same seed, i.e., a = 5 (black line) and a = 9 (gray line).
nents of GDP represented in Figure 1 for the same seed and a = 5, i.e. production of
consumption goods and investments in capital goods, the real GDP time series (bottom
panel) exhibits long-run growth and irregular business cycles. The unemployment rate
time series (central panel) is characterized by peaks which occur simultaneously with
the bottoms of GDP cycles as well as steep drops (or increases) when the economy
is booming (or in recession). Aggregate ﬁrms’ physical capital (top panel) exhibits
a steady growth characterized by relatively small ﬂuctuations which, considering the
capital depreciation and the ﬂuctuations of investments, are consistent with the cycles
in the bottom panel of Figure 1 and the real GDP in Figure 2.
A clear difference emerges in the long run between the paths with a = 5 and the
ones with a = 9. In particular, the Eurace economy with a = 5 is characterized by
higher long-run growth of both production and physical capital, and consequently
lower unemployment. This is actually a quite general result as shown in Tables 2
to 5, where the ensemble average over 10 random seeds has been considered and the
complete set of 6 a values is shown.
Tables from 2 to 5 consider eight important economic variables, related to both
the level of economic activity, such as the real GDP, the unemployment rate, and the
aggregate capital stock in the economy, and to banks’ balance sheets and lending ac-
9Real GDP Total credit a
1 - 5 6 - 20 21 - 40 1 - 5 6 - 20 21 - 40
4 4629 (28) 5509 (45) 6239 (106) 18057 (250) 19897 (340) 18986 (729)
5 4608 (22) 5466 (31) 6064 (81) 18458 (157) 19533 (152) 17781 (609)
6 4669 (9) 5390 (40) 5859 (75) 20130 (133) 19799 (246) 16844 (447)
7 4725 (20) 5429 (33) 5918 (82) 20808 (222) 20200 (298) 16733 (933)
8 4767 (26) 5382 (33) 5715 (139) 21006 (216) 20083 (210) 16326 (927)
9 4714 (12) 5457 (36) 5920 (124) 20770 (178) 19989 (228) 16621 (780)
Table 2: Ensemble averages and standard errors (in brackets) of real GDP and total
credit for different values of a. Statistics are computed over 10 seeds of the random
number generator.
Banks’ equity Credit rationing (%) a
1 - 5 6 - 20 21 - 40 1 - 5 6 - 20 21 - 40
4 4048 (64) 4610 (103) 2560 (203) 12.2 (0.1) 0.2 (0.1) 10.5 (0.2)
5 3664 (79) 3851 (242) 1954 (433) 4.3 (0.1) 0.0 (0.0) 13.8 (1.7)
6 3588 (87) 3699 (232) 1621 (423) 0.5 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 8.3 (1.1)
7 3279 (94) 3032 (248) 1436 (622) 0.0 (0.0) 0.9 (0.7) 15.1 (3.3)
8 3072 (31) 2941 (162) 1319 (510) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 14.1 (3.1)
9 2957 (46) 2902 (258) 1192 (334) 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.1) 13.5 (2.8)
Table 3: Ensemble averages and standard errors (in brackets) of banks’ aggregate eq-
uity and credit rationing (%) for different values of a. Statistics are computed over 10
seeds of the random number generator.
tivity, such as the equity stock, the total credit supplied and the percentage of credit
rationing suffered by ﬁrms. Tables include also two main nominal variables, namely
the price and the wage levels. With regard to prices, it should be noticed that in a non
money-neutral economy prices depend both on real and monetary variables and that the
monetary aggregate in the Eurace model is endogenous, because it depends on the total
credit supply. Three different periods have been considered, i.e., the ﬁrst 5 years of the
simulation (the short run), the central part of the simulation (the medium term) and the
last 20 years (the long run). The time averages of the variables have been considered
in any period and, in order to increase the robustness of results, the values in the tables
report the ensemble averages of the time averages. The ensemble averages have been
computed over 10 different seeds of the pseudo-random number generator. Standard
errors are shown in brackets.
Thetablesshowhowtheensembleaveragevaluesoftheeconomicvariableschange
with respect to the different values of the allowed leverage level a. Furthermore, the
three reference periods permit to interpret the macroeconomic implications of the dif-
ferent strategies of leverage regulation, according to the considered time span. In par-
ticular, a major difference is evident comparing the short run (the ﬁrst 5 years) and the
long run (the last 20 years). The results observed in the ﬁrst 5 years can be interpreted
considering that the risk weighted assets of each of the three banks have been initial-
10Firms’ capital stock Unemployment (%) a
1 - 5 6 - 20 21 - 40 1 - 5 6 - 20 21 - 40
4 9307 (20) 14881 (354) 20916 (880) 15.6 (0.6) 12.7 (0.4) 12.5 (0.3)
5 9446 (33) 14128 (282) 19959 (677) 16.9 (0.5) 11.7 (0.5) 13.9 (0.5)
6 9495 (12) 13690 (356) 17983 (638) 15.3 (0.2) 11.8 (0.5) 13.6 (0.6)
7 9573 (23) 13802 (276) 18302 (577) 14.2 (0.4) 11.6 (0.3) 13.2 (0.5)
8 9634 (26) 13414 (357) 16737 (1036) 13.5 (0.6) 11.5 (0.4) 13.1 (0.7)
9 9575 (19) 13946 (325) 18489 (1000) 14.5 (0.3) 11.5 (0.3) 13.4 (0.5)
Table4: Ensembleaveragesandstandarderrors(inbrackets)ofﬁrms’aggregatecapital
stock and unemployment rate (%) for different values of a. Statistics are computed
over 10 seeds of the random number generator.
Price index Wage level a
1 - 5 6 - 20 21 - 40 1 - 5 6 - 20 21 - 40
4 0.76 (0.00) 0.87 (0.02) 1.07 (0.03) 1.53 (0.02) 2.0 (0.05) 2.82 (0.11)
5 0.76 (0.00) 0.84 (0.01) 1.05 (0.03) 1.53 (0.02) 1.88 (0.05) 2.74 (0.10)
6 0.77 (0.00) 0.82 (0.01) 0.97 (0.02) 1.53 (0.01) 1.81 (0.04) 2.43 (0.09)
7 0.78 (0.00) 0.83 (0.01) 0.98 (0.02) 1.54 (0.00) 1.83 (0.04) 2.47 (0.08)
8 0.78 (0.00) 0.81 (0.02) 0.92 (0.04) 1.54 (0.00) 1.77 (0.06) 2.25 (0.14)
9 0.78 (0.00) 0.83 (0.02) 0.98 (0.04) 1.55 (0.00) 1.86 (0.05) 2.51 (0.15)
Table 5: Ensemble averages and standard errors (in brackets) of aggregate price and
wage levels for different values of a. Statistics are computed over 10 seeds of the
random number generator.
ized to be ﬁve times the initial level of equity. This implies that for values of a lower
or equal to 5, the constraint on bank leverage is binding and it is not possible for banks
in the short run to increase the supply of credit in order to match the demand by ﬁrms.
Thelimitationofbanks’loansexplainsthehighpercentagevaluesweobserveforcredit
rationing in the ﬁrst 5 years for a = 5 and in particular for a = 4, see Table 3, and the
consequent lower level of credit-money in the economy as observed in Table 2. The
lower level of credit supply reduces the opportunities for ﬁrms to invest, to increase
production and to hire new workers, and this is clearly evident in the short-run values
of GDP, employment and ﬁrms’ capital stock which are the lowest for the values of a
less or equal to 5 and increase more or less monotonically as a increases, see Tables 2
and 4. On the contrary, the aggregate equity level of banks is monotonically decreas-
ing with the leverage level a in the short run. In fact, in the case banks face a credit
demand higher than their supply constraints, as ﬁxed by the institutional arrangements
(a) and their equity level, they stop the payment of dividends to raise their net worth
and to become able to meet the demand of credit in excess of supply.
The short run macroeconomic implications of the different values of a fade if the
medium term time span is considered (years between 6 and 20) and disappear in the
long run. Indeed, it emerges that the short run implications are somehow reversed
in the second half of the simulation, where we observe a better economic welfare on
11average for the highest capital requirements (low values of a), and in particular for
a = 4. The values of real GDP in table 2 actually show that lower capital requirements
do not allow for economic expansion in the long run. We state that banks’ equity plays
again a crucial role in determining these ﬁndings. In fact, ﬁrms’ failures occurring in
the course of the simulation and the consequent debt write-offs reduce considerably
the equity of banks, see Table 3. Furthermore, the consequences of ﬁrms’ failure are
more severe when the value of a is high. The reasons is twofold: ﬁrst in the case of
low capital requirements (high a), banks do not stop dividends’ payments, due to the
absence of credit rationing in the short run; therefore, they keep their net worth at the
initial relatively low levels; second, debt write-off are higher for more indebted ﬁrms,
and ﬁrms’ indebtedness is higher for high a, due to the easier access to credit in the
short run. In fact, as it is clearly evident in Table 3, banks’ equity levels in case of lower
capital requirements are small in the ﬁrst part of the simulation and are also subject to
the biggest reduction.














































Figure 3: Banks’ aggregate equity level (top panel) and aggregate amount of outstand-
ing loans (bottom panel). Two different values of a have been considered for the same
seed, i.e., a = 5 (black line) and a = 9 (gray line).
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of the aggregate equity of banks (top panel) and the
total level of loans supplied by banks to ﬁrms (bottom panel). It is worth reminding
that the dynamics of the equity of any bank depends on dividends’ payments and on the
eventuality of debt write-offs, due to ﬁrms’ bankruptcy. In normal conditions, banks
12usually pay out all their proﬁts as dividends to shareholders; however, in the case the
Basel II-like institutional constraint set by a is binding, i.e., the demand for credit
at a bank is higher than the allowed supply at the present equity level, then the bank
stops dividends payments in order to increase its equity and thus being able to satisfy
the entire loan demand in the future. This behavioral feature explains the increase in
the aggregate level of equity that is occurring in the case of low as. In particular, it is
worth noting the rise in the aggregate equity level that can be observed in the ﬁgure (top
panel) at the beginning of the simulation for a = 5, i.e., when the constraint is more
binding and therefore credit rationing is expected to occur. This effect can be examined
also by looking at banks’ equity values of the ﬁrst 5 years in table 3, considering that
bank’s equity is always initialized at a value close to 3000 (as shown also by ﬁgure
3). The subsequent large drops of equity in ﬁgure 3 are therefore explained by ﬁrms’
bankruptcy and consequent debt write-offs.
The dynamics of the aggregate amount of loans (bottom panel) is consistent with
the equity paths represented in the top panel, in particular whenever the demand for
loans is rationed by insufﬁcient levels of equity on the side of banks. In fact, at the
beginning of the simulation the aggregate amount of outstanding loans in the a = 5
case is lower than the amount in the a = 9 case, consistently with the aggregate equity
increase occurring for a = 5 which indicates credit rationing. Furthermore, in the
second part of the simulation, the higher amount of outstanding loans for a = 5 can
be explained by the lower severity of credit rationing in that case, as the higher equity
level for a = 5 should clearly indicate.
Figure 4 shows the dynamics of two key nominal variables of the economy, i.e.,
the price (top panel) and the wage level (bottom panel). The paths of the two variables
exhibit a general upward trend with some volatility, in particular for prices. It is worth
noting that the steepness of the upward trend depends on a and on the period consid-
ered. In particular, in the short run the price and wage values are generally higher for
a = 9, while in the long run the upward trend of prices and wages is clearly steeper
for a = 5. This result is consistent with the ﬁgures showed in the tables and with eco-
nomic intuition, i.e., the dynamics of prices and wages positively depends on the one
of monetary aggregates and on the conditions of the real side of the economy.
Figure 5 shows in the top panel the dynamics of the monetary aggregate, i.e. the
aggregate amount of liquid monetary resources in the Eurace economy, and presents in
the bottom panel the sum of the aggregate amount of outstanding loans and of central
bank liabilities. The monetary aggregate is deﬁned at any time as the sum of all private
(i.e., held by households and ﬁrms) and public (i.e., held by the Government and the
Central Bank) deposits plus banks’ equity. The initial value of the aggregate amount
of outstanding loans is given by the sum of the debt of any ﬁrm, where ﬁrms’ debt has
been uniformly initialized so to have a leverage, i.e., a debt to book value of equity
ratio, equal to 2, considering also the assigned book value of assets. In real economies
the amount of outstanding banknotes is part of the central bank liabilities. In Eurace,
the initial value of central bank liabilities is deﬁned as residual, i.e., as the difference
between the initial value of the previously deﬁned monetary aggregate and the initial
aggregate amount of outstanding loans. The high-powered money provided by the cen-
tral bank is therefore the part of the monetary aggregate not explained by banks’ loans.
In absence of a quantitative easing policy performed by the central bank, i.e., if the cen-


























































Figure 4: Price level (top panel) ana wage level (bottom panel). Two different values
of a have been considered for the same seed, i.e., a = 5 (black line) and a = 9 (gray
line).
tral bank does not inﬂate its balance sheet by purchasing government bonds, as it is the
case for the results presented in this study5, central bank liabilities has to be considered
constant, and the variation of the monetary aggregate should be eventually explained
only by the dynamics of the aggregate amount of outstanding loans. Figure 5 conﬁrms
the above argument, as the time value of the monetary aggregate (top panel) is identical
to the time series presented in the bottom panel, i.e., to the value of outstanding loans
plus central bank liabilities, the latter to be considered constant in the simulations. This
result further corroborates the rationale behind the theory of endogenous money. The
different behavior observed with respect to the two values of a is consistent with the
ﬁgures presented in the tables and with previous considerations. In particular, the val-
ues of the monetary aggregate and its counterpart, i.e. the aggregate outstanding loans
plus the central bank liabilities, are characterized by higher values in the short run for
a = 9, while in the long run the situation is reversed and the time series referred to
a = 5 dominate.
The clear evidence of results presented in this study is that the monetary aggregate
plays a key role in determining the real variables of the economy. Furthermore, the
5A study about the effects of quantitative easing in the Eurace economy can be found in Cincotti et al.
2010 [14].





































































































Figure 5: Aggregate amount of liquid monetary resources (top panel) and aggregate
amount of outstanding loans plus central bank liabilities (bottom panel). Two different
values of a have been considered for the same seed, i.e., a = 5 and a = 9.
monetary aggregate is made by two components, an endogenous one, or endogenous
money, which is given by the aggregate outstanding loans created by the banking sec-
tor, and an exogenous one which is set by the monetary authorities, i.e., by the central
bank. The ﬁrst component should be considered as endogenous because is determined
by the self-interested interaction of private agents, i.e., banks and ﬁrms, while the sec-
ond component can be considered as exogenous because may depend on discretionary
unconventional monetary policies, like quantitative easing. The rate of growth and
long-run dynamics of endogenous money, however, depends also on parameters or in-
stitutional constraints, like a, which can be considered as exogenous because set by the
regulatory authorities. Actually, the main result of the paper regards the role of a policy
setting, like banks’ capital adequacy ratio, on the dynamics of endogenous money and
therefore on the growth of the economy.
Investigating the role played by the monetary aggregate in the real economy has
been the subject of research in economics for many years and is still the topic of a wide
debate, as testiﬁed by the controversy between endogenous and exogenous money the-
orist [9, 17, 18]. In this paper, we limit to point out an interesting similarity between
Eurozone economic data and Eurace data concerning the cross-correlation between the
percentage variations of GDP and percentage variations of M3, as shown in ﬁgure 6.
15The left panel shows the cross-correlation diagram between the percentage variations
of real GDP, shown in Figure 2 (bottom panel), and the monetary aggregate, shown
in Figure 5 (top panel), both for a = 5. The right panel presents again the cross-
correlation diagram computed now considering the percentage variations of Eurozone
real GDP and the percentage variation of a broad measure of the monetary base, the
so-called M3. Eurozone cross-correlation diagram has been computed on a quarterly
base, contrary to the Eurace case, where data are all macroeconomic data are conven-
tionally generated on a monthly time scale. In fact, Eurone GDP are provided on a
quarterly base, therefore also M3 data, which are recorded on a monthly base, has been
transformed to a quarterly time series, by considering the quarterly average. Eurozone
GDP data are working day and seasonally adjusted as well as chain-linked to adjust
for inﬂation with the 2000 as reference year. Eurozone GDP data refers to the period I
quarter 1995 - IV quarter 2010, while M3 data to the period January 1995 - December
2010. All data are available on Internet at the European Central Bank statistical data
warehouse6.
It is worth noting that, apart the different time scales involved, the two cross-correlation
diagrams are characterized by a similar pattern, as in both cases the percentage vari-
ations of real GDP lead the percentage variations of the monetary aggregate. This
ﬁnding further conﬁrm the rationale behind the theory of endogenous money, stating
that the stock of money is determined by the demand for bank credit, which is in turn
induced by the economic variables that affect the GDP.
3 Conclusions
After start of the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2007, an increasing attention has been de-
voted to the design of proper regulation systems of the banking sector. A great effort
has been done in order to understand and foresee the consequences of different regu-
lation strategies on the stability of the ﬁnancial system, on growth, and on the main
macroeconomic variables. As pointed out in the introduction, many reports on this
topic are available, mainly produced by central banks research centers or by interna-
tional organizations. One of the central themes is the assessment of the long-term
impact of different capital requirements for banks. The methodology is typically based
on a set of economic models that originate in the DSGE class, which are estimated or
calibrated according to data sets belonging to speciﬁc countries or areas.
Theaimofthispaperistotacklethesametopicusinganagent-basedapproach. The
Eurace model provides with a complex economic environment where to run computer
simulations and to perform what-if analysis related to policy issues. The model has
been calibrated by using realistic empirical values both for the parameters of the model
and for the state variables initialization.
Capitaladequacyratio, i.e., theratiobetweenbanks’equitycapitalandrisk-weighted
assets, has been chosen as the key varying parameter that assumes six different values.
For each value a set of ten simulations with different random seeds has been run, and
the results have been reported and analyzed.
6http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu














































































Figure 6: Cross-correlation diagram between Eurace real GDP and monetary aggregate
data (left panel) and between Eurozone real GDP and M3 data. The dashed symmetric
bounds refers to the 95 % conﬁdence level interval for the sample cross-correlation
under the null hypothesis of zero theoretical cross-correlation. The bounds values are
given by  2 p
N, where N is the sample size. This explains the difference between the
left panel bounds, where we have 480 monthly data, i.e., 40 years of simulation, and
the Eurozone case (right panel) characterized by only 64 quarterly data, i.e., the 16
years from 1995 to 2010.
The outcomes of the models consist of time series that are characterized by quite
realistic graphical patterns. In particular long-run growth and endogenous business
cycles are observed. The capital adequacy ratio proved to have signiﬁcant macroeco-
nomic implications that depend critically on the considered time horizon.
In the short run (up to ﬁve years) a lower leverage policy, restricting the credit
supply, has negative macroeconomic consequences, reducing growth, investments and
employment. Actually, the limited credit supply determines ﬁrms’ rationing, whereas a
higherleverageallowsﬁrmstogetloanswithoutincurringincreditrationing. However,
the higher debt load that ﬁrms acquired in the short run in the case of less restrictive
policies, i.e., low capital adequacy ratio, turns out to have signiﬁcative implications
if considered along with the lower equity capital of banks. Indeed, in the case of
low capital adequacy ratio, ﬁrms ﬁnancial fragility becomes higher and consequently
ﬁrms bankruptcies are more frequent. These bankruptcies undermine the equity capital
17of banks, that in the case of high leverage has not been sufﬁciently raised by banks,
determining a severe reduction of the lending capacity of the banking sector in the
long run. On the other hand, if capital adequacy ratio is higher, ﬁrms experience less
opportunities to increase production and hire new workers in the short run, but later,
due to the higher equity of banks, that needs to raise it by retaining dividends in order
to face the credit demand, the banking system proves to be more stable, with lower
values of credit rationing and a higher level of total loans.
According to the outcomes of the Eurace model, the credit dynamics markedly
inﬂuences the macroeconomic activity. The banking system is therefore crucial, and
an appropriate set of regulations seem to have great potential beneﬁts for growth and
economic stability. The model we presented reproduces in detail the interaction among
economic agents, and shows that it can already be effectively used as an environment
where performing economic analysis and forecast, and where testing policy strategies.
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